Introduction
Across the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) world, family policies are on the rise. Whilst Nordic countries are typically considered the pioneers in this policy domain (Morel, Palier, and Palme 2012) , we observe that latecomer countries of not only Europe (Lewis et al. 2008 ) but also East Asia have made considerable efforts to catch up with the northern European frontrunners. In this article, we analyze the development of family policy in the two East Asian latecomer countries of Japan and South Korea, where we witness significant policy expansion starting in the 1990s. The rise of family policy in these countries can be considered a departure from the established policy path, since the East Asian developmental welfare state largely excluded families from public social welfare provision. While both countries experienced a remarkable expansion of family policy, it is intriguing that the "regional pioneer" of Japan was eventually outpaced by Korea not only in terms of the speed and scope of policy expansion Survey Programme (ISSP) and, to substantiate the claim that attitudinal demands translated into policy expansion, we rely on 20 semi-structured interviews with Korean policy-makers and bureaucrats, whereas we refer to in-depth, secondary analyses of the Japanese case, which include rich qualitative material (including documents and interviews).
The Developmental State and the Family
East Asian countries are latecomers in the institutionalization of welfare states. Social welfare provision developed in the context of late industrialization, and the East Asian developmental welfare state was built by conservative elites in the absence of competitive politics. Although Japan democratized in 1955, the LDP monopolized political power for most of the post-war period. For this reason, the Japanese state was typically described as "soft authoritarian" (Johnson 1987) , and it was not before 1993 that the LDP found itself on the opposition benches. By contrast, Korea's authoritarianism was more obvious with the creation of a single-party regime after the 1961 military coup. Elections were no more than an instrument of the dictatorship to formally legitimize its rule (Holliday 2000, 715; Johnson 1987, 143-44; White and Goodman 1998, 15) .
In the developmental state, we find a clear division of labor between politicians and bureaucrats. The former set broad policy goals, whereas the latter were in charge of policy planning, the development of new policy, and their implementation. Highly centralized bureaucracies, sharing with politicians the key objectives of industrialization and economic development, are considered key to the coordination of different policies for economic growth, and the developmental (welfare) state is typically associated with bureaucratic dominance in policy-making (Goodman and Peng 1996, 196; Holliday 2000, 715) . It was thought that economic growth and the associated prosperity would legitimize authoritarian rule, which made the developmental state a strategy of 'stability through growth' (Holliday 2000, 715 ; see also Kwon 1997, 497-80) .
At early stages of industrialization, however, social policy was considered incompatible with economic development, as growth strategies pursued light, labor-intensive manufacturing, where pressure on labor costs left little room for welfare provision. When the economic success of light-industry-driven development created labor shortages and corresponding pressure on wages, a shift in the developmental strategy towards higher-value-added heavy industry made economic development in the region and social policy compatible. The need for human capital investments for greater labor productivity and labor force stability provided the socio-economic underpinnings for higher expenditure on education and training in particular, but also on health and enterprise welfare (Deyo 1992) . The developmental welfare state literature and the related productivist welfare regime approach (Holliday 2000; Holliday and Wilding 2003b , Kwon 1997 , 2005 highlight that social policy was used instrumentally and strictly subordinated to the imperatives of economic growth and rapid industrialization in order to catch up with the West.
However, the developmental state was highly selective in its welfare efforts and investments, and it concentrated social welfare provision on the presumably productive parts of the population, especially skilled workers in large companies for productivist reasons, but also civil servants and the military in order to ensure the loyalty of these groups. Looking at the coverage of early social insurance schemes (health care and old-age security), we find that large parts of the population were excluded (Goodman and Peng 1996; Kwon 1997, White and Goodman 1998) . Not only social protection for more vulnerable members of society but also social care were not considered good investments but a burden on the economy (Holliday and Wilding 2003a) . In other words, early social policies in the region focused on male industrial workers in strategic sectors, whereas labor market outsiders and especially women were largely excluded from welfare provision. Also, the notions of social citizenship and redistribution we know from the development of Western welfare states received very little political support. In fact, we find a "clear hostility to the European welfare state" (Holliday and Wilding 2003a, 167) , as it was believed among conservative elites in politics and bureaucracies that European-style social policy would undermine the traditional Confucian family.
Critically, the developmentalist logic was reinforced by the Confucian ethos, which shaped societies in the region. Confucianism ascribes great importance to the family and encourages rigid gender roles, with the men as the "natural" head of the family and its breadwinner and with women as the provider of care (Sung and Pascall 2014 ; see also Lewis 1992 on the male breadwinner model). Confucian values were compatible with the developmental welfare state, as the ideals of filial piety and family obligations provided a template for unpaid care work by women and social protection through the family (in particular, by the means of inter-generational monetary transfers) (Jones 1993) . These welfare arrangements allowed the developmental state to prioritize economic over social development. Developmentalism and Confucianism were complementary to each other, and created a stable equilibrium (cf. Hall and Soskice 2001 on the notion of institutional complementarities).
Thus, in the familialistic and developmental welfare states of Japan and Korea, support for families and especially women's labor market participation was minimal at best. During the long, unchallenged tenure of the conservative LDP government in Japan family policy received very little attention. Limited childcare provision was geared towards children in low-income families, where the well-being of children was considered at risk because of the (necessary) employment of both parents. Even when female employment participation started picking up in the 1980s, the child-welfare-centered approach to childcare persisted, because policy-makers viewed women only as a temporary workforce to deal with labor market shortages. Thus, these limited services were not intended to promote female employment, and in practice did not facilitate much defamilization. While Japan institutionalized maternity leave in the immediate post-war period, the scheme saw very moderate take-up, as women were conventionally expected to resign in the event of pregnancy in order to avoid being a burden to their employer and colleagues. As far as the cash dimension of family policy is concerned, Japan offered a modest, means-tested child allowance for very young children (An and Peng 2016; Boling 2015) .
In Korea, similar to the period of LDP hegemony, we find an absence of meaningful public support for families until the late 1990s. Very limited public childcare was available only to low-income families, and the child-welfarecentered approach to childcare, observed during the unchallenged LDP rule in Japan, could also be found in Korea. As with service provision, the cash and time dimensions were underdeveloped as well. Maternity leave was paid but short (maximum of two months), and only mothers were entitled to unpaid parental leave (Ministry of Labour 2008). In any case, similar to the Japanese situation, pregnant women were expected to resign from their jobs (Won and Pascall 2004) .
Post-Industrialization and the Decline of Confucianism
The family model of Confucianism and the developmental state have been successively undermined by post-industrialization. As with Western countries, post-industrialization in East Asia was accompanied by a significant increase in female employment participation (see Figure 1) . While Korean female employment participation is still below the OECD average, Japan has surpassed the OECD average. However, if one looks at full-time equivalent employment rates, one finds Korea (with 55.2 percent in 2013) outperforming the majority of Western countries (e.g. U.K 52.2, Germany 52.3, France 51.8, Netherlands At the same time, fertility has seen a dramatic decline in Japan and Korea, reaching ultra-low rates not only below the replacement rate but also tailing behind most of the OECD world (see Table 1 ). The low fertility indicates that Japanese and Korean families face serious obstacles to producing adequate future labor forces. We also observe an extraordinary increase in divorce rates in the region (see Table 2 ), in addition to the ever-falling number of multi-generation households (see Table 3 ). These trends indicate a growing risk of families failing to fulfil their role of welfare and care provider. They also suggest an increasing incidence of lone parents and dual earners with young children, leading to rising work/family conflicts in the absence of kinship care or care services provided outside the family.
Based on these observations, we conclude that the Confucian family ideal has been eroding in Japan and Korea, and that families are now under considerable "stress." The strong male breadwinner bias in Confucian ideology (Sung and Pascall 2014) has fueled the rise of work/family conflicts in the face of increasing female employment. These developments have established the socio-economic underpinnings for a greater role of the state in family affairs, as with Western countries (Esping-Andersen 1999; Lewis 2009). 
Family Policy and the Transformation of the Developmental State
Japan is typically considered the region's "pioneer" in social and family policy expansion, and it was the early 1990s when family policy started to receive greater attention (see Boling 2015; An and Peng 2016 for Japanese family policy expansion). Towards the very end of LDP hegemony, in 1992, a new one-year parental leave scheme was introduced, which, however, remained at first unpaid and did not include a legal enforcement mechanism. Two years later, the first center-left government introduced a modest wage replacement of 25 percent. In light of this weak institutionalization, it comes as little surprise that the widespread practice of women resigning from their jobs before childbirth continued, with almost one in four women quitting their job between 1995 and 1999.
When the LDP was ousted from power for the first time in 1993, Japanese politics entered into new territory. Although the non-LDP coalition government was short-lived, the LDP could only return to power in the form of coalition governments. In this new period of political instability, we observed major policy initiatives in the service domain to increase childcare provision. The Angel Plan (1994 Plan ( -1999 and the New Angel Plan (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) -the former was promoted by center-left forces and the latter under LDP leadershipset out an ambitious expansion of childcare services; and the enrolment rate for children under the age of three, for instance, was more than doubled from 10.1 in 1995 to 24 percent in 2010. However, successive governments fell short of meeting their childcare targets, as local governments struggled to deliver government's expectation; and waiting lists remained long. Even after the then Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (from the LDP) made a bold pledge in 2001 to eliminate waiting lists for childcare, the situation remained difficult, forcing many parents to use low-quality yet expensive unlicensed childcare providers. Despite the persistence of problems, it is fair to conclude that the rise of the political left gave important impetus to service provision. By contrast, when the conservative LDP-Komeito coalition took office (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , the cash element improved substantially in 1999 and 2007. Importantly, the child allowance was extended to families with older children and higher incomes; and for younger children, the government increased the amount of the allowance. This child allowance expansion points to greater familization, as it represents increased condition-free support for the family unit and can be deemed to provide a disincentive for mothers' work. Unlike the services and cash dimensions, the development in the time dimension saw only modest improvement in benefit generosity during the LDP-Komeito coalition government.
When the center-left returned to government led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , it continued the child allowance expansion of its predecessor. The eligibility was significantly broadened to include all children under the age of fifteen regardless of family income. Nevertheless, the DPJ government fell short of implementing its election pledge of bolder improvements in benefit levels. Following a somewhat modest increase, the government promised to meet the initial election pledge by 2011. The planned expansion, however, experienced a significant setback when the 2011 Tohuko earthquake put the most severe financial constraints on the country. To fund disaster relief programs, the opposition forces achieved harsh cutbacks, including the reintroduction of the income ceiling. In care leave policy, the DPJ government was successful with a slight improvement in benefit generosity (now 50 percent wage replacement rate) and with the introduction of two "daddy months." Lastly, to increase the number of daycare places for children, the DPJ government intended to implement organizational reforms, but these did not materialize because of considerable resistance in the bureaucracy as well as among childcare professionals.
Turning to Korea, we also find that family policy did not receive much attention before the political left gained weight in Korean politics (see An and Peng 2016; Lee 2012 for Korean family policy expansion). It was only during the first center-left government of Kim Dae-Jung (1998 -2003 that family policy was expanded in a meaningful manner. The most significant improvement occurred in the area of services, as the government intended to increase both the demand and supply of childcare services. To boost the supply of childcare services, the government made it easier to open childcare centers by abolishing the previous requirement for government approval. The deregulation of childcare provision led to a near doubling of the number of private nurseries during the tenure of the government (from 6,538 centers in 1997 to 11,046 centers in 2002). With regard to demand-side intervention, the government introduced childcare allowances for low-income families. A series of reforms were implemented to improve the time dimension for parents with childcare responsibility. Maternity and parental leave schemes were expanded in terms of duration and benefit; and the parental leave scheme, with a new flat-rate benefit, was also made available to fathers.
Under the second center-left government of Roh Moo-Hyun (2003 , family policy gained prominence. Once again, the service dimension experienced the most substantial advancement. For the first time, the government subsidized childcare costs of middle-class families, with the explicit objectives of promoting female employment and investing in young children. Unlike its predecessor, which sought a market-driven expansion of childcare services, the Roh government was committed to public service expansion in order to improve the quality of service. However, similar to the Japanese experience with the Angel Plan, the Roh government's ambitious target of public daycare center expansion faced considerable opposition from local governments, and Korea remained heavily reliant on private providers. To support the care function in the family, the Roh government improved the benefit generosity of the parental leave scheme, and gave each parent an individual entitlement of twelve months. Here, it is noteworthy that the two center-left governments disregarded child allowances, but pursued childcare provision as a means of defamilization, and parental leave as a means of familization. Despite pulling in different directions in terms of labor market participation, both policies contributed to work/family reconciliation.
The ten years of center-left rule in Korea marked a turn to investments in families, and family policy expansion did not stop when the conservative Saenuri Party returned to office in 2008. In fact, the governments of Lee Myung-Bak (2008 -2013 and Park Geun-Hye (2013-present) accelerated the path departure initiated by the center-left. The conscious efforts of the Saenuri governments to outbid the advancements made by their predecessors suggest a remarkable policy U-turn by the conservative party given that in the past the party upheld strongly traditional family and gender role values with its promotion of a "housewife-friendly society," showing a very similar ideological platform to its Japanese counterpart.
Improving the cash dimension, the Lee Myung-Bak government first introduced a homecare allowance for low-income families whose children (under the age of two) did not use externally provided childcare. Second, the flat-rate parental leave benefit was transformed into an earnings-related scheme with a wage replacement rate of 40 percent. Although the benefit ceiling remained modest (with 1,000,000 won per month [approximately 575 GBP]), this reform doubled the maximum benefit one could receive. Also, the service dimension saw considerable improvements during the Lee government by gradually expanding childcare support to ever larger parts of the population. By 2012, childcare became free for all pre-school children except three-and four-year-olds regardless of household income.
The current Park Geun-Hye government completed the expansion of free childcare services, as childcare became also free for all children aged three and four. The new government furthermore introduced national curricula seeking to boost the quality of early education in childcare services. Whilst the complete shift to free universal childcare presents a "Nordic" policy change, Korea continued to rely heavily on private providers. At the very same time, the homecare allowance became universal for all preschool children, in addition to doubling the benefit amount for the under one-year-olds. Taken together, recent policy changes doubled family policy expenditure between 2010 and 2013.
While post-industrial pressures can explain the existence of a greater need for family policy intervention in Japan and Korea, it does not provide a sufficient explanation of why the expansion happened with greater speed and scope in Korea as compared to Japan. It is difficult to interpret that greater structural pressure existed in Korea. Also, a functionalist perspective cannot account for different patterns of family policy expansion. OECD social expenditure data confirms that Korea put a firm focus on childcare expansion. Early childhood education and care (ECEC) has grown out of virtually nothing to more than 1 percent of GDP, and it accounts for almost 90 percent of all Korean family policy expenditure. By contrast, in Japan, cash benefits in the form of family/child allowances represent about 50 percent of family policy expenditure. In terms of percentage of GDP, the family allowances have seen an almost sevenfold increase since the 1990s. ECEC has grown much more modestly and accounts for only about one-third of Japanese family policy expenditure (OECD.Stat 2016). To explain the differences in family policy expansion in the two countries, we highlight the importance of political agency by taking a view that structural pressure does not automatically translate into policy changes without the involvement of political actors. Thus, we now turn to investigating the role of politics to explain the greater speed of reforms in Korea, in addition to the divergent pathways of reform in the face of similar, if not the same, structural pressures.
The Political Drivers of Family Policy Expansion
Early efforts to improve work/family reconciliation in Japan are commonly associated with the so-called "1.57 shock" of 1989, when the issue of low fertility (including its socio-economic implications) took center stage on the political agenda. Following this critical event, Seeleib-Kaiser and Tuivonnen, from an ideational viewpoint (cf. Béland and Cox 2011; Campbell 2002) , observe "significant discursive shifts" (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011, 348) , and argue that the rise of work/family policies was "largely engineered by key policy entrepreneurs" (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011, 349) . In particular, they highlight the importance of well-known academic scholars, who put forward economic and human capital arguments for employment-oriented family policies (Seeleib-Kaiser and Toivonen 2011).
Peng (2008, 2004 ) also draws attention to ideational changes in Japan, as well as in Korea. She underlines, however, civil society pressure (especially from women's organizations) and bureaucrats' concerns about the decline in fertility. While the theme of civil society activism is well established in the East Asian welfare state literature (Kim 2008; Wong 2004) , others have called into question the strength of women's agency in family policy in the region. Schoppa, with reference to the Japanese case, argues that "organized women's groups were poorly positioned" (Schoppa 2010, 48) , and often organized around housewife issues, whereas feminist organizations were generally weak (see also Boling 2015, 123) . Schoppa, who views the scope of work/family reconciliation policy expansion in Japan critically, concludes that a "silent revolution" took place in which women mostly accommodated the forced choice of the system and exited either motherhood or career (Boling 2015, 423) . Exit rather than voice translated into the observed ultra-low fertility. Similarly, we find only modest influence of women's agency in Korea. During the ten years of center-left governments, with the creation of the women's policy unit and later on its promotion to the ministry of gender equality, feminist associations might have enjoyed greater influence (especially in agenda-setting) than their Japanese counterparts. However, it is doubtful that feminist agency was the driving force behind family policy expansions given the limited power resources of femocrats (Won 2007) , many of whom came from (feminist) civil society organizations; and even women bureaucrats in the ministry conceded in interviews that they lacked the power of their labor and welfare counterparts and depended on support from the president. Also, center-left lawmakers who were sympathetic towards the ministry's agenda confirmed that the ministry lacked the power to drive the childcare agenda, but depended on support from the president and party to overcome considerable reservations if not opposition from other government ministries; and parental leave legislation stayed with the ministry of labor. Furthermore, their relationship with the government turned adversarial when the conservative Lee Myung-Bak government attempted to abolish the ministry of gender equality, suggesting a further weakening of their policy influence. Yet, policy continued to expand, indicating that policy expansion did not depend on female agency in the ministry of gender equality.
Schoppa's argument of limited voice is also confirmed when looking at female representation in parliament. Although we have seen increases in female representation (and in fact greater representation in Korea where we observed more family policy expansion) (see Figure 2) , the number of female members of parliaments (MPs) in both countries throughout the 1990s and 2000s was significantly below the "critical mass" of 30 percent, which is typically considered to be necessary for female MPs to have a significant impact on policy (Childs and Krook 2008; Dahlerup 1988 ). Looking at the Japanese case in greater detail, Gaunder (2012) notes that both the LDP and DPJ consciously increased the number of women politicians in response to the need to appeal to a broader set of voters, notably women. Newly elected female MPs, however, were not only too few in numbers but also too junior to make much difference (see also Miura and Hamada 2014 on the weakness of female representation in Japan).
Peng's emphasis on the bureaucracy is important, since the developmental (welfare) state literature ascribes great significance and, in fact, considerable policy autonomy to bureaucrats. Schoppa (2010, 428-429 ) shares Peng's observation that Japanese bureaucrats became increasingly worried about fertility decline and related labor market problems, especially when labor market shortages became more severe in the late 1980s. Thus, civil servants showed concerns before their "political masters". To address identified problems the ministry of labor, for instance, proposed to improve childcare leave. The length of one year was thought to encourage women to return to the labor market. In the corresponding legislation of 1992; however, as discussed earlier, only unpaid leave with no meaningful enforcement mechanisms was introduced. Employers mobilized heavily against the care leave legislation, as they had done before in the 1970s and 1980s (see also Lambert 2007) . The LDP, concerned about the burden on employers, responded to business pressure, as they had in the past. And with the women's movement lacking the will or capacity to press for more progressive legislation, negotiations were essentially between the ministry and employers, which ensured that the male breadwinner model was not challenged.
Hence, unlike the experience in some European countries (Fleckenstein and Lee 2014; Swenson 2002) , businesses in Japan and actually in Korea as well (Lee 2012 ) present themselves as "antagonists" in work/family reconciliation policy and hold policy preferences that are very similar to their counterparts in liberal market economies (see Korpi 2006 for the notion of antagonists). Apparently, businesses remained unconvinced of the presented business case; that is, the economic and human capital reasoning behind employment-oriented family policy expansion. Providing an explanation for employer opposition, Estévez-Abe (2005 , 2006 argues that the predominance of firm-specific skills, as found in Japan and Korea, increases the costs of women's employment because of the greater risk of career interruption due to child rearing. This is a key factor as to why employers do not perceive the benefits of work/family reconciliation. Instead of promoting female employment, women are pushed to the margins of the labor market, minimizing the costs of women's employment.
Employers had important allies, not only among politicians but also in the bureaucracy. Peng (2008) notes ideational battles between technocrats in the finance ministries, who took a fiscally more conservative approach, and welfare bureaucrats, who supported family policy expansion. The battle lines can be observed in both Japan and Korea; in the case of the latter, we also find the newly created ministry of gender equality supporting family policy expansion. Looking at the Japanese case in greater detail, Boling (2015) notes that welfare bureaucrats continued to perceive childcare as a child welfare issue (typically geared towards children in troubled families) rather than a means of work/ family reconciliation and social investment. However, divisions can be observed within the ministry. Bureaucrats from the "welfare side" supported mothers taking parental leave, whereas the "labor side" took a more positive view on childcare in order to facilitate a quick return of mothers into the labor market. The prospect of more meaningful expansion was also undermined by bureaucrats' reluctance to mobilize significant resources for policy innovations, as the problem of long-waiting lists was largely considered a temporary problem in light of an anticipated decline in the number of children (see also Miura and Hamada 2014) . Concluding her insightful analysis of the Japanese case, Boling intriguingly notes that welfare bureaucrats did not perceive the challenges of low fertility and the opening up of the political system as a window of opportunity for expanding their policy portfolio, but rather as an unwelcome disruption of established communication channels with the LDP. One might thus want to conclude that Japanese bureaucratic policy-making was biased towards stability.
On closer examination of the Korean case, we also find some lack of enthusiasm for employment-oriented family and social investment policies within the bureaucracy. As with Japan, welfare bureaucrats, being somewhat lukewarm about childcare expansion, saw childcare primarily as an intervention to improve children's welfare rather than a means to promote female employment or as an investment in children's human capital. On parental leave, labor bureaucrats were not able to speak with one voice, as some opposed the use of the unemployment insurance fund to pay for leave benefits. The only marked difference in the Korean case was the earlier mentioned support from the newly created ministry of gender equality, which was keen on family policy expansion. Evidence from interviews indicates that the ministry pursued childcare expansion not only for ideological reasons but also to secure larger budgets in order to overcome their "powerlessness." While gender bureaucrats showed great enthusiasm, they lacked political capacity (Lee 2012) .
Rather than focusing on bureaucrats or civil society agency, Estévez-Abe and Kim (2014) propose an institutional model that suggests a greater "political opportunity structure" in Korea. They essentially argue that Korean presidents hold greater power than Japanese prime ministers because of the institutional structures of the respective political systems. Although it is plausible that directly elected Korean presidents, at least in electoral campaigns, are more sensitive to new social needs, it is less clear why Korean presidents, who cannot be re-elected, are in a better position to discipline parliament than Japanese prime ministers. Rather, one could argue, the absence of a chance for re-election reduces the costs of abandoning election pledges, and presidents might face an opposition majority in parliament. The latter happened to both center-left presidents in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and presidents of different political persuasion dropped or watered down social policy election pledges in the face of parliamentary or party opposition. Although we do not want to challenge that the president is of critical importance in Korean policymaking, the popular notion of 'imperial president' needs to be put into perspective. Having said this, we acknowledge Korean presidents' capacity to reorganize the government, including the reorganization of government ministries; and in the case of the center-left Roh government, it is important to note that childcare policy was assigned to the ministry of gender equality, which was most enthusiastic about childcare expansion. While this can be seen as making bureaucratic policy-making easier (given reservations in other ministries), it also needs to be acknowledged that the retransferral of childcare policy to the ministry of welfare by the conservative Lee government did not stop childcare expansion. In fact, it accelerated, as discussed earlier, under conservative leadership. Critically, though providing some important insights into policy-making, an institutional model struggles to account for the motivation of presidential leadership. The Lee government wanted to put its own "fingerprint" (namely, a child-welfare-centered approach as opposed to a feminist agenda of female employment promotion) to gain issue ownership of childcare expansion, which was initiated by the center-left. Also, one might want to suggest an inconsistency in the institutional argument, as Estévez-Abe and Kim contend that the Japanese electoral reform of 1994 did not translate into the expected changes. Whereas the previous electoral system of multimember districts and single non-transferable vote facilitated selective policy measures for electorally important groups (typically in the form of surrogate social policies) rather than providing comprehensive universal social welfare (Estévez-Abe 2008), the new system, with currently 295 members of the Lower House elected from single-member districts and 180 members from multi-member districts by a party-list system of proportional representation, ascribes much greater importance to voters in the political center (see also Boling 2015; Rosenbluth and Thies 2010) . Estévez-Abe and Kim suggest that the limited impact of the electoral reform is related to unchanged patterns of prime minister recruitment because of short party leadership selection cycles. However, the need for regular party leader confirmation at party conferences is not an institutional feature that is unique to Japan but can be found in other countries (such as Germany) without creating a "hot seat" for heads of government or preventing comprehensive policy reform in the first place. In fact, the German case is interesting here, as the country experienced rather "social-democratic" family policy expansion under conservative leadership despite severe intra-party conflicts (Fleckenstein 2011) .
Rather than pointing to the limited capacity of Japanese prime ministers, Ochiai and Johshita's (2014) analysis of Japanese prime ministers' discourse from the late 1950s to 2012 suggests that LDP prime ministers, who continued to dominate much of post-1993 Japan, lacked commitment to work/family reconciliation policy. Interestingly, Ochiai and Joshita note that, from the mid-1990s (coinciding with the end of the old electoral system), the family had become an increasingly political issue. However, they also show that LDP prime ministers were slow to change. For instance, Hashimoto, who was prime minister from 1996 to 1998 and a very influential figure in the LDP throughout the 1990s, was very reluctant to revise the LDP's conservative family model in the face of socio-demographic changes. Also, Abe, during his first term in office (2006) (2007) , essentially displayed the party's ideological position of the 1980s, where the family was perceived as the main welfare provider and wives were assumed to be homemakers. This analysis of the persistence of conservatism in Japanese politics could be read in terms of an ideational barrier towards policy change. However, given that the starting points of the LDP and its Korean conservative counterpart were rather similar in terms of their stance on female employment and work/family reconciliation policy, the question arises as to why the LDP was much more cautious about policy modernization.
Electoral Competition and the Rise of Parties in Welfare Politics
In both Korean and Japanese welfare politics, democratization and democratic consolidation, respectively, have been highlighted as important drivers of social welfare expansion (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Shinkawa 2007; Wong 2004) . In 1987, Korea saw the end of military dictatorship with the first free presidential election; and in Japan, the LDP failed, for the first time, to form a government in 1993, which marked the end of one-party rule in Japanese politics. In the following year, the above-mentioned electoral reform undermined the party's ability to harvest electoral majorities out of special interests (such as farmers and small businesses). Instead, urban voters in The Politics of Investing in Families particular (Pempel 2008 ) but also young people (Noble 2010) have been identified as new critical voting groups that parties need to compete for, pulling politics into the political center. Noble (2010) shows that the bloc of volatile, independent voters broke the 50 percent mark in 1995, thus making it imperative to attract these voters with policies. In Korea, the literature highlights the importance of regionalism in electoral politics in the aftermath of democratization. Rather than campaigning on policy platforms, party leaders relied on extraordinary electoral support from their party's regional strongholds. Also, party leaders were "sons" of their party's home region (Kim 2000 (Kim , 2011 . This regional party identification, however, has been declining steadily, and we observe the emergence of a new age-based cleavage, with younger voters displaying greater receptiveness to progressive policies (Kang 2008; Kim, Choi, and Cho 2008) .
These developments challenge many taken-for-granted rules in East Asian politics. In tandem with democratization, Korea underwent a process of "welfare state deepening," as Japan experienced some important welfare state expansion in the face of democratic consolidation (Peng and Wong 2010) . While the universalization of the fragmented social insurance system was a priority at first, the two countries also improved family policy provision to better support families generally, and especially (working) women with dependent children. We have shown that it was initially the political left which drove public support for families and work/family reconciliation. In the 1990s, with the Angel Plan, the Japanese left successfully spearheaded the expansion of childcare provision during its five years of government tenure (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) . Following the regional pioneer, Korea-with the ten years of left incumbency-saw the greatest rise of family policies helping with work/family reconciliation (An and Peng 2016) . In the light of these early developments, one might be inclined to explain policy expansion in terms of the power resources model highlighting the importance of left-wing forces in welfare state building; and more specifically the combination of the political left and feminist agency in family policy expansion (cf. Korpi 1983; Huber and Stephens 2001) . In fact, the greater expansion in Korea might be explained through the "additional" presence of feminist agency in the ministry of gender equality and in civil society, as discussed earlier. Having said this, contrary to partisan theory and perceived wisdom, we have seen that investments in families continued when the political right returned to government office. It thus appears that conservative parties responded to the agenda-setting and reforms of their left competitors.
But why did party competition in Korea become so much fiercer than in Japan, and result in much bolder policy expansion? In particular, it is rather striking that the conservative Saenuri Party in Korea modernized its family policy platform to a much greater extent than the LDP in Japan. As dominant parties in their countries, Saenuri and LDP are of pivotal importance for the gestalt of party competition in the two countries, and its impact on welfare politics. To account for the difference in family policy expansion and party competition, we analyze attitudinal data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which provides strong evidence for different political incentive structures in the two countries to pursue social and specifically family policies for electoral reasons. While Estévez-Abe and Kim (2014) , drawing on proxy questions for Confucianism (namely, "marriage is outdated," "being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay" and "one of main goals in life has been to make my parents proud"), conclude that there are no attitudinal differences between Japan and Korea, we look more specifically at attitudes towards female employment and social and family policy preferences. Unlike what is portrayed by Estévez-Abe and Kim, we find considerable differences between Japan and Korea; and these differences, we argue, shaped electoral dynamics and party competition rather differently in the two countries.
To start our general examination of attitudes towards social policy, we look first at attitudes towards the government's role in reducing levels of inequality (see Table 4 ), and we find a more than 20 percentage point difference between Korea (75.1 percent) and Japan (54.1 percent). In light of this first observation, it is not surprising that Koreans also display much greater support for providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed (see Table 5 ). Attitudes towards benefits for the unemployed might be described as a "litmus test" for welfare state support, as unemployment protection faces particularly high barriers to legitimization. While you are rarely "blamed" for old-age, sickness, or disability, you might be held accountable for unemployment because of an assumption of insufficient readiness for work as the cause The Politics of Investing in Families of unemployment (i.e. the debate over deserving vs. undeserving poor). These important two indicators point to much greater general welfare state support in Korea than in Japan. Looking more specifically at family policy and attitudes towards female employment, we find the persistence of conservatism in both countries, but to a much greater extent in Japan, where more than two-thirds believe that women should stay at home in the presence of a child under school age (see Table 6 ). In Korea, less than half of the population holds this strong view, and almost every other person supports part-time employment. Only a very small minority in both countries favors full-time employment. Interestingly, there is no significant gender difference in support of stay-at-home mothers in Japan (2.3 percent difference between men and women), but Korean women display more progressive views than their male counterparts (7.8 percent). As one would expect, we find the greatest support for female (part-time) employment amongst young women. Whilst the literature assumes an urban/rural divide to drive Japanese policies towards the center, we actually find, counterintuitively, a weaker presence of progressive values in urban areas.
In light of these attitudes towards female employment participation, it is hardly surprising that more than three-quarters of Japanese people say that childcare for preschool children should be primarily provided by family members (see Table 7 ). The Korean figure is almost 20 percentage points lower. In particular, a much greater role is ascribed to government agencies. It is noteworthy that, as far as family care is concerned, we do not observe any significant gender difference, neither in Japan nor in Korea. Surprisingly, we find more conservative views expressed by young Japanese women, as compared to all Japanese women and even to the overall population. And again, Japanese rural residents display more progressive attitudes than their urban counterparts. In Korea, young women hold the most progressive values. Lastly, on the issue of who should pay for childcare, we find the majority of Japanese (60.3 percent) ascribing this responsibility to families, whereas the majority of Korean (55.9 percent) calls for the government to act accordingly (see Table 8 ). Again, we do not observe any significant gender differences across the entire electorate. However, looking at the attitudes of young Korean women, we find the 26-35 (77.8 percent) and the 36-45 year olds (66.2 percent) calling for government funding; this compares with about 50 percent of Japanese women in these age groups. And as before, urban Japan does not pull policies into the political center.
These data show some considerable attitudinal differences between Japan and Korea. Generally, we find greater support for government responsibility in the Korean electorate. This applies to the state's role in reducing inequality and providing a decent standard of living for the unemployed, as well as the provision of childcare. These calls for government intervention are The Politics of Investing in Families extraordinary as perceived wisdom does not expect Confucian societies like the Korean one to turn to the state, but to rely on the family and the community (cf. Jones 1993) . Admittedly, with regard to female employment participation, we observe the persistence of some conservatism in Korea (especially, the limited support for full-time employment as typical elsewhere), but nonetheless the presence of progressive values, especially if compared to Japan, is remarkable. It is noteworthy that, at the level of the general population, neither Korea nor Japan have seen the modern gender gap that has started to emerge in many Western countries with women leaning towards more progressive political views (cf. Abendschön and Steinmetz 2014; Inglehart and Norris 2000) . However, as expected from a party competition point of view in childcare policy, we find much greater support for public funding among young women (the main beneficiary of childcare support), suggesting the emergence of a more complex gender/generation gap (cf. Norris 1999) . Corresponding with the bolder expansion of childcare provision in Korea, we find much more progressive attitudes among young Korean women. In a nutshell, the ISSP data analysis shows much more fertile ground in Korea for social policy and specifically childcare policy expansion. These differences in attitudes observed in Japan and Korea provide the political parties in the two countries with rather different political incentive structures to campaign for social and family policies. Korean parties face much stronger bottom-up pressure for welfare state expansion and more progressive family policies. The Korean center-left party was a pioneer in responding to the pressure by making family policy a key election promise. Interview material provides strong evidence of a growing awareness in the center-left party that the reliance on regional votes would not be sufficient for electoral victory in the future. This applied in particular to the 2002 presidential election with Roh Moo-Hyun as a candidate. Roh could not rely on strong support from his home region, which was a conservative stronghold, and it was also feared that he might insufficiently mobilize regional votes from the party's heartland, from which all previous center-left presidential candidates had come. However, the party knew about its popularity among young voters, which generally considered Roh a progressive candidate. In this context, explicitly confirmed in interviews, the party and its candidate made a deliberate decision to campaign over work/family reconciliation policy to mobilize these potential voters, which are generally associated with a lower electoral turn-out than older voters, upon which the conservative party generally relied on for victory. Not only was work/family reconciliation policy considered an area that was particularly relevant to young voters and that reinforced the progressive image of the candidate, but also it was argued that unemployment protection and old-age security had seen too much expansion during the Kim DaeJung government to campaign over "traditional" social policy expansion. Further to this, the conservatives, started, albeit cautiously, to recognize the electoral benefits of work/family reconciliation policies; and this was in turn perceived by the center-left as additional pressure to "outbid" Saenuri in this policy domain to retain issue ownership. In fact, one interviewee described childcare policy as the most important social policy issue in the 2002 presidential election. Thus, the decision to put work/family reconciliation centerstage was a strategic decision for voter mobilization. After losing two consecutive presidential elections, the Korean conservative party also came up with bold promises of family policy expansion, intending to attract young voters among whom the party had struggled to garner support. While the 2002 presidential campaign had already recognized the electoral value of work/family reconciliation policy (and the party abandoned its previous "housewife-friendly" policy), interviews confirm that the 2002 presidential defeat was critical in rethinking more radically the party's approach to work/family reconciliation policy. Furthermore, towards the 2007 presidential election, it was acknowledged that, as a result of the progress made during the two center-left governments, family policy had gained considerable political salience, and it was understood that leaving young voters to the center-left party would seriously undermine Saenuri's chances of electoral victory. In the run-up to the 2007 election, Chun Jae-Hee, a female legislator with a long record of work/family reconciliation advocacy, was appointed as one of the two deputy chiefs of its campaign team, demonstrating the conservative party's determination to devise a comprehensive family policy platform which was Koizumi recognized the importance of competitive urban districts that were considered vital for the LDP's electoral fortunes. He thus used the pressure from Komeito to get his party reluctantly to accept benefits for urban voters, and the LDP indeed increased its appeal to urban voters under Koizumi's leadership. The DPJ jumped onto the bandwagon with bold pledges to improve child allowances in order to highlight its support for families. Compared with childcare expansion, child allowances have the appeal that, in principle, they can be implemented much more easily than pledges to eradicate waiting lists for childcare centers. Nonetheless, the DPJ in government faced some challenges here as well; especially after the 2011 Tohuko earthquake and tsunami, which understandably shifted the country's attention to disaster relief, as mentioned earlier. Also, returning to the ISSP data analysis, the greater persistence of traditional values in Japanese society (even among young women) makes the increase of child allowances (rather than childcare expansion driving defamilization) an electorally more sensible strategy if a party wants to show that it takes support for families seriously. Ambitious childcare expansion challenging dominant gender stereotypes might "upset" too many voters.
Although developments in Japan might not be as bold as developments in Korea, improvements in child allowances and the rising prominence of childcare with the Angel Plans are nonetheless significant, as they indicate a challenge to the hegemony of the LDP and bureaucrats in social policy-making, and the rise of competitive politics where policies have gained increasing importance in electoral campaigns. Thus, even though the LDP remained the dominant party, the electoral reform undermined its previous unchallenged position and its ability to prescribe, together with government bureaucrats, policy developments. In earlier work, Estévez-Abe (2008, 234) , specifically referring to parental leave legislation, also wrote that the political competition brought by the electoral reform made the LDP accept reform policies that would have been non-starters in the 1955 political system.
Conclusions
Both Korea and Japan have pursued some remarkable family policy reforms since the 1990s, challenging perceived wisdom of the developmental and Confucian literatures. While Japan, at first, pioneered defamilization with the Angel Plans, attention later moved to familization measures with improving child allowances. Following the early lead of its large neighbor, Korea prioritized defamilization measures, which eventually resulted in universal free childcare provision under conservative leadership. Korean conservatives also promoted, although to a lesser extent, familization with the introduction of the homecare allowance for stay-at-home parents. Both countries also improved parental leave schemes.
The Politics of Investing in Families
The far more ambitious family policy expansion in Korea (especially with regard to childcare policy) can be ascribed to the greater extent of party competition as compared to Japan. We have shown the presence of much more progressive values in Korea, to which political parties of the left and the right (possibly somewhat opportunistically) responded. Here, the U-turn of Korean conservatives is most important, as this created a new political equilibrium for family policy. In addition to outbidding its center-left competitor with universal childcare provision, the Saenuri Party, in pursuit of a catch-all party strategy (cf. Kirchheimer 1966) , offered the homecare allowance for stay-at-home mothers to its more traditional electorate. By contrast, the generally more traditionalist Japanese electorate did not provide the same pressure or political opportunity structures for comprehensive family policy expansion and defamilization. Instead, party competition increasingly focused on the child allowance as a measure of familization in the face of the continued dominance of social conservatism.
More recently, however, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who reentered government office in 2012, has started to promote greater labor market participation of women, and pledged to create 400,000 additional childcare places by 2017 (although it has been said that the government's proposals for achieving this have been somewhat vague). As part of his "Abenomics" agenda, female employment is considered a top priority for better economic performance and growth (Boling 2015, 120; Miura and Hamada 2014, 14) . These recent developments suggest that the gap in family policy between Korea and Japan might be closing with the LDP, mainly for economic reasons it appears, presenting much more women-friendly policies.
